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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This litigation involves the problems and difficulties 
involved when a small municipality of 1600 residents 
first adopts a general ordinance regulating the uses 
of property located within its boundaries, and (as re-
spondents view the case) the attempts made thereunder 
by a city council to regulate and control such uses and 
property rights by specific provisons added to its gen-
1 
eral ordinance which were adopted contrary to the 
recommendations of its planning commission, and which 
specific provisions were directed expressly against re-
spondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants Patterson for more than 15 years have 
operated a farming and livestock activity in the extreme 
northern portion of Davis County in the community 
of Clinton. Their holdings consisted of approximately 
310 acres of cultivated crop land (Tr. 68) , and 80 acres 
of salt grass pasture land, on which were located 
corrals and facilities for keeping livestock on approxi-
mately 12 acres. The 310 acre farm, referred herein 
as the "Home Farm" was located in a relatively sparsely 
populated area generally west of the second parallel 
set of railroad tracks lying westerly of Highway 91 
(Tr. 13, 19); the 80 acre salt grass pasture (and feed 
lot facilities) lying approximately another mile west 
of the "Home Farm". 
Over the years the defendants would devote the 
cultivated crop land to the summer growing of field 
corn, which was cut in the fall and placed in open pit 
silos for winter feeding use. All the corn silage was 
fed, together with certain purchased mixed supple-
ments, to cattle which defendants bought and sold 
throughout the year's operation. Although the numbers 
of cattle would fluctuate from month to month, a maxi-
mum of approximately 2,500 head of cattle would be 
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placed in the feed lot on the 80-acre field at the extreme 
,1-est end of Clinton City during the period between 
April 15 and October 15 when the weather was warm 
and <lry (Tr. 74). In the fall when the weather became 
11etter the animals were taken from the feed yard about 
October 15th, and placed in the various fields of the 
"Home Farm" after the corn was harvested. The 
animals were fed on the fields during the wet winter 
months, and were moved from field to field so that their 
droppings would uniformly and evenly provide for a 
thin layer of fertilizer to be left on the fields. Imme-
diately after the removal of the cattle from the fields 
on or about April 1st of each year the fields were either 
plowed or disced so that the fertilizer would be utilized 
to enhance the growing of corn during the f olowing 
summer season. Needless to say, the lands of the Pat-
tersons were extremely fertile and customarily produced 
earn silage which would yield an average of 25 ton of 
corn silage per acre (Tr. 17 4) . 
It was conceded by all parties to the litigation that 
the feed yards where the animals were kept during the 
summer months on the 12-acre area of the 80-acre 
sale grass tract at the extreme west end of Clinton City 
was in fact a "feed yard". Actually defendants annually 
secured a permit, or license, from the Utah State De-
partment of Agriculture for the operating of this yard 
(Tr. 80). 
The manner of operation of the corn fields for 
feeding purposes during the winter months is outlined 
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in Findings of Fact number 4 (R. 11-12), but can be 
generalized as follows: The cattle were taken from the 
feed lot, or from direct purchase deliveries, and dis-
tributed into several of the various farm fields after 
the crops were removed. They ate the stubble and 
residue from the harvest and were fed corn silage from 
the farm production, mixed with other ingredients, 
during the winter months. The fields were fairly large 
in size, thereby affording maximum movement for the 
animals. They were fed from a truck which would 
come into the field and transfer the feed into portable 
feeding troughs from which the cattle could come and 
feed from time to time. The feeding troughs were port-
able and customarily moved at intervals of from 2 to 
4 days so as to allow the droppings from the livestock 
to be deposited uniformly over the entire field in quan-
tities sufficiently limited so as to permit the fertilizer 
to be plowed or disced under when springtime and 
warm weather arrived. Care had to be taken so as to 
avoid placing too much fertilizer on the land (since 
this would cause the crops to burn and die during the 
hot summer season) , and the system permitted each 
field to be so fertilized on a rotation basis of every-
other or every-third year. 
This system of winter feeding on the fields as 
utilized by defendants was a somewhat modernized and 
mechanized version of an old practice among farmers, 
and had been a common means of feeding livestock in 
the Clinton area for many years (Tr. 47, 90). 
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During 1963 one of the stalwarts and venerable 
citizens of that area-Mr. John D. Hooper-passed 
away. Among his assets was a 100 acre tract of farm 
]and in Clinton, located approximately one mile south 
of the defendants' "Home Farm", near the southern 
houndary of Clinton City. This farm eventually was 
offered for sale in probate proceedings, and the Pat-
tersons decided to bid on the property. Similarly, others 
in the Clinton area, known as the "Muir Group", also 
decided to bid on the same property at court sale-with 
the thought that the land could ultimately be utilized 
for subdivision purposes (Tr. 196, 197). 
As a result of court bidding for the property, here-
inafter referred to as the "Hooper Farm", the Patter-
sons prevailed-and the seed was planted which grew 
into this lawsuit. The date of the purchase of the 
"Hooper Farm" was January 28, 1964 (Tr. 165). 
At or about the time of the purchase of the "Hooper 
Farm" by the Pattersons, Clinton City was preparing 
to adopt its first general ordinance. This ordinance, 
typical of many which have been adopted by commu-
nities in Utah, recognized non-conforming uses and 
"Uses of Right", including thereunder agricultural 
uses. The general ordinance was adopted on February 
Ii, 1964-just 20 days following the purchase by de-
fendants of the 100 acre "Hooper Farm"-and included 
a restriction under Agriculture (R. l) as foll9ws: 
(1) -Agriculture, as defined herein, and specific-
ally excluding livestock feed lots. 
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After purchasing the "Hooper Farm" the defend-
ants permitted the existing tenant to remain in posses-
sion during the remainder of the winter season; how-
ever, commencing in the fall of 1964 they placed 965 
head of cattle on the "Hooper Farm" for winter feeding 
under the system previously outlined ( 'l'r. 86). These 
animals were maintained during substantially most of 
the winter season on this property. Incidentally, as 
will be pointed out later, the "Hooper Farm" and the 
number of livestock maintained thereon constituted the 
chief bone of contention in the litigation which followed. 
On June 3, 1965, immediately following the 1964-
1965 winter feeding operation of the Pattersons on 
the ''Hooper Farm", Clinton City, possibly because of 
severe doubts which existed among the city councilmen 
as to whether the operation on the "Hooper Farm" 
was that of a "feed lot" (Tr. 58), passed and adopted 
an Amended Ordinance which added the two new sub-
paragraphs ( 5) and ( 6) to the existing ordinance, es-
tablishing the following Uses By Right: 
" ( 6) (a) The seasonal winter feeding, pastur-
ing, and maintaining of domestic ani-
mals upon lots or property of 5 acres 
or more during the period in each win-
ter season, commencing October 15, and 
ending April 1, of each 12-month pe-
riod, provided that there shall be no 
feeding, maintaining, or pasturing of 
more than 6 head of livestock per acre 
subject to the conditions hereinafter 
stated. 
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(b) The land upon which said animals have 
been winter fed, pastured, or main-
tained must he plowed or deep disked 
at least once immediately following the 
above-stated seasonal period. Seeded 
pasture need not be tilled. 
( d) In no event, and regardless of the size 
of the land area, shall there be more 
than 250 head of livestock confined 
within the same fenced area." 
(See Supp. Record) 
During the following winter season of 1965-1966 
the defendants again placed livestock on the "Hooper 
Farm" in the amount of 1,015 head (Tr. 86), which 
exceeded the number provided for in the June 3, 1965 
Amended Ordinance. Thereafter, on February 9, 1965, 
this action was commenced against defendants by a 
Complaint ( R. 1) wherein it was alleged: 
"2. That the above named defendants con-
duct a business of operating cattle feed 
lots within the City Limits of Clinton 
C 't ., I y, • • • 
In seeking injunctive relief plaintiff further al-
leged (R. 2): 
"4. That the defendants and each of them 
are operating feed lots for cattle within 
the City Limits of Clinton City on 
property which has been zoned for Ag-
ricultural Use, and defendants are now 
using and operating f-;-ed lots for cattle 
on said property in viola ti on of the 
ordinances of Clinton City." 
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The matter was set for trial before Hon. Thornley 
K. Swan; however, plaintiffs' attorneys filed an Affi-
davit of Prejudice as to Judge Swan, and the matter 
was tried on May 3, 1966 before the Hon. Charles G. 
Cowley at Farmington, Utah. From an adverse judg-
ment holding that the operations of the defendants 
on the "Hooper Farm" did not constitute a "feed lot" 
operation and holding that defendants were entitled 
to winter feed 1,000 head of cattle on the "Hooper 
Farm", both as a reasonable use and as a non-conform-
ing use, plaintiff has appealed against these defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANTS 'VERE NOT CONDUCT-
ING A "LIVESTOCK FEED LOT" OPERA-
TION ON THEIR "HOOPER FARM". 
Zoning ordinances of the type here involved, which 
restrict and limit the uses to which private real property 
can be put, must be strictly construed as a matter of law. 
Further, ordinances of the type here involved which 
carry with them penalties are further subject to the 
rules of strict construction. With these principles in 
mind it is rather interesting to observe the comment 
made on page 2 of the plaintiffs' Brief where it stated 
that the lower court did not provide " ... any definition 
of what constitutes a 'livestock feed yard' ". 
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It was just this failure of the ordinance itself to 
define a "livestock fed lot" which generated so much 
nf the confusion in this case and which-in the opinion 
of the defendants-rendered that portion of the ordi-
nance invalid. 
"An ordinance must be clear, precise, definite 
and certain in its terms, and an ordinance vague 
to the extent that its precise meaning cannot be 
ascertained is invalid." 
Ex parte Westellison, 38 Okla. Crim. 207, 259 
Pac. 873. 
"A zoning ordinance to be valid must comply 
with the requisites pertaining to ordinances gen-
erally, i.e. enactment in good faith, definiteness 
and certainty, reasonableness, uni/ ormity of op-
eration and freedom from discrimination.'' 
Brady v. Keene 90 N. H. 99, 4 A. 2d 658 
McQuillen "Municipal Corporations'' Vol. 8 
sec. 25.59, p. 128 
"Like all ordinances, a zoning ordinance to 
be valid must be reasonably definite and certain 
in its terms so that it is reasonably capable of 
being understood." 
Johnson v. Huntsville 249 Alabama 36, 29 
Southern 2d 342 
Since the Clinton City ordinance is penal in nature, 
it must be strictly construed. 
Zoning ordinances are penal in nature. 
Ex. pare W estellison (above cited) 
Mallett v. Village of Marnoroneck 123 N.Y.S. 
2d 249 
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The Clinton City Ordinance is penal. 
".2-10 VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE 
AND PENALTIES. 
Any person, firm, corporation, whether as prin-
cipal, agent, employee or otherwise, violating 
any of the provisions of this ordinance or re-
quirements or decision of the Board of Adjust-
ment shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
upon conviction thereof by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction shall be punishable by a fine 
of not more than two hundred ninety nine 
($299.00) dollars, or by imprisonment for a 
term not to exceed six ( 6) months, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment. Such person, firm 
or corporation shall be deemed to be guilty of 
a separate offense for each and every day dur-
ing any portion of any violation of this ordi-
nance is committed, continued by such person, 
firm, or corporation, and shall be punishable 
as herein provided." 
Clinton City Ordinance 2-10 
Ordinances must be of sufficient definiteness and 
certainty to define a criminal offense. The necessity for 
certainty is compounded when the ordinance is penal 
in character. Penal ordinances like penal statutes are 
to be strictly construed. 
Ex. parte W estellison 38 Okla. Crim.207 259 
Pac. 873 
" ... zoning ordinances and regulations should 
establish uniform rules to guide administrat~ve 
officers in applying them. The rule merges with 
that of definiteness and certainty; zoning re-
structions mu.st be clear as a ru.le of l,aw and not 
left to proof." 
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McQuillen, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 8, 
sec. 25.62, p. 138 
"The restriction on property rights in the sev-
eral zones must be declared as a rule of law in 
the ordinance and not left to the uncertainty of 
proof of extrinsic evidence parole or written." 
Johnson v. City of Huntsville 29 So. 2d 342 
"The rule of certainty and definiteness of zon-
ing ordinances verges on or is identical with the 
rule that they must establish a clear rule or stand-
ard to operate uniformly and govern their ad-
ministration, in order that arbitrariness and dis-
crimination in administrative interpretation and 
application be avoided." 
M cQuillen, "Municipal Corporations" Vol 8, 
sec. 25.59, p. 128 
• • • 
An ordinance which does not properly define its 
terms can be arbitrary and unreasonable, and void. 
"Furthermore, the definition of junkyard in 
Sec. 10 of the ordinance cannot be sustained. If, 
as contended by the appellee, the "and", as used 
therein, is to be interpreted as "or", it is obvious 
that dealing in either hides, furs, rubber, wool, 
used cars or other used car parts, does not with-
out some other specification or qualification, con-
stitute dealing in junk or make the place of any 
such business a junk yard. The ordinance does 
not comply with any accepted definition of the 
junk business. Webster's definition of "junk" is: 
"Old iron or other metal, glass, paper, cordage, 
or other waste or discarded material which may 
be treated or repaired so as to be used again 
in some form." Dealing in used cars and used 
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car parts. carries wit~ i~ the idea of their being 
used agam for the or1gmal purpose, without re-
processing. Junk, as the term is ordinarily un. 
derstood, means articles that have outlived their 
usefulness in their original form, and are com. 
monly gathered up and sold to be converted into 
another product, either of the same or a different 
kind by some manufacturing process." 
"In our opinion the above mentioned provi-
sion of sec. 9 and the definition of a junk yard 
in Sec. 10 of the ordinance are not in accord 
with the provisions delegated by the zoning act, 
and are so arbitrary and unreasonable as to 
render those sections void. \Ve are further of the 
opinion that even if otherwise valid, the ordi-
nance, as applied to the appellants' newly ac-
quired property is clearly arbitrary and unrea-
sonable, and therefore void as to such prop-
erty." 
Watseka v. Blatt 320 Ill. Appeals 191 50 
N. E. 2d 589, 381 Ill. 276, 46 N. E. 2d 374 
"Generally in the construction of zoning ordi-
nances, particularly where they are penal in 
character with respect to one being prosecuted 
thereunder, they will be construed subject to 
the principle that the words used must be give~ 
their common acceptation. Common sense, ord1· 
nary, and natural meanings are preferred, ... '' 
McQuillen "M11-nicipal Corporations", Vol. 8, 
sec. 25.71 p 159. See also: 
Carroll v. Arlington Co. 186 Va. 575, 44 S.E. 
2d 6 
Jones v. Board of Adjustment of Denver, 119 
Colo 420, 204 P2d 560 
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I _........._ 
Being forced to defend their position as to whether 
rJr not they were conducting a "feed lot" operation on 
the" Hooper Farm", defendants went to the 1964 Ordi-
nance (Exhibit A) , but could find nowhere therein any 
definition of a livestock "feed lot". However, the ordi-
nance did provide some help in the following statement 
relating to "Interpretation": 
" ... If in the course of admininstration here-
of, a question arises as to the meaning of any 
phrase, section or chapter, the interpretation 
thereof given by the Chairman of the Planning 
Commission shall be construed to be the official 
interpretation thereof." 
Lewis Patterson, who was Chairman of the Planning 
Commission, testified (Tr. 1-7 5) that the city officials 
never asked him for any interpretation of the phrase 
"livestock feed lot". 
It might be understandable that the plaintiff city 
officials were acting under a clear misapprehension as 
to the definition of the term in their proceedings against 
the defendants had not Mayor Saunders readily ad-
mitted that the term was giving substantial confusion 
to both the city council and the planning commission: 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Has the council ever asked 
the chairman of the Planning Commission 
to furnish it with a definition of what con-
stitutes a feed lot? 
A. I know that this was a matter of discussion 
with them. 
Q. In other words, you mean that was a matter -
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of discussion between some members of the 
council with the Planning Commission? 
A. I know it was a matter of discussion amongst 
the council members, as well as amongst the 
members of the Planning Commission. 
Q. I see. So the definition of what constitutes 
a feed lot has been discussed within the Plan-
ning Commission, as well as the council? 
A. Yes, I believe so. 
• • • 
(T. 59) 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) All right, now any of these 
other properties or fields, the one across from 
your home or the field back of Mr. Patter-
son's home on 2300, or across the road, is 
the council treating these as feed lots or as 
an area subject to this other ordinance cover-
ing winter feeding? 
A. Now I would say that there has been a vari-
ance of opinion on the council itself. 
Q. In other words, the council can't agree; it· 
that right? 
A. 'V ell, no. There has been a variance of 
opm10n. 
Q. I see. 
A. Generally speaking, I believe they would 
regard this as a winter feed lot. 
Q. As a winter feed lot? 
A. Uh, huh. 
Q. All right.Now this Hooper Property, is this 
a feed lot or a winter feeding operation un-








lot? I would like to know what the city is 
considering these operations as being? 
A. 'V ell, I can speak for myself, and I know 
some members of the City Council would 
consider this a winter feed lot. 
Q. 'V ell, I take it, that some members of the 
council don't consider this as a winter feed 
lot, either the Hooper Property or these 
properties, except for the area clear to the 
west; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. This has been a matter of, not con-
tention necessarily, but a question in the 
minds, I think, of everyone on the council 
just what does constitute a feed lot as such. 
(Tr. 57-58) 
Faced with a lack of definition in the ordinance 
and absolute confusion in the minds of city officials, 
defendants undertook to establish from experts in the 
livestock business what ingredients were necessary to 
constitute a feed lot. The following definitions were 
given: 
FRANK PATTERSON: 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) No. We want to know what 
you think a feed yard is ? 
A. Well, a feed yard is where you feed, and 
you've got your permanent fence, your per-
manent mangers and your permanent water. 
That's a feed lot. 
Q. According to your definition of what consti-
tutes a feed yard or a feed lot, would you 
classify any of the feeding operations on the 
Hooper place or in the vicinity of your Home 
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place as coming within the definition of a 
feed yard or feed lot? 
A. No. 
Q. Would you classify the operation in the pens 
on the 12-acre portion of the 80 acres as con-
stituting a feed yard? 
A. Yes, that's a feed yard. 
(Tr.93) 
* * * 
. A. Well, my definition of a feed yard - If 
they're not there over six months, then they're 
. not a feed yard. They've got to be there over 
six months to be a feed yard .. 
( ~r. Fuller) : That's all I have.You may cross 
examme. 
(Tr. 99-100) 
* • • 
CHARLES PARK 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) From your experience in 
the business, would you give the court your 
definition of what a feed yard or feed lot is? 
A. Well, my definition of a feed lot would be 
where the cattle are put in a corral that's 
fenced and put in a small area and fed there 
permanently. That's· a feed lot. Now that's 
my definition of one. 
Any farmer that has a cow or a lamb or 
whatever he has, a horse, and run them in 
the fields, I wouldn't call that a feed lot. 
Q. Now as to the operation that the Pattersons 
are conducting with their winter feeding, by 
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your definition would you classify that as 
a feed lot operation? 
A. Down west where they have them in them 
corrals, yes, I would call that a feed lot. 
Where they are scattered around through 
the fields and moved off, I wouldn't call that 
a feed lot. 
Mr. Fuller: Thafs all I have. 
(Tr. 156} 
* * * 
LEWIS PATTERSON: 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Would you give us, if you 
will, your definition of what constitutes a 
feed lot, Mr. Patterson? 
A. I feel that a feed lot must be fully enclosed 
with permanent fencing, that it must have 
permanent feed racks-feed bunks, as you 
might call them-must have a permanent 
water facility, and the cattle must be kept 
in that enclosed area at least 180 days. 
Q. During what period of time? Continuously, 
or by a year, or by what standard are you 
using? 
A. Within a year's time, yes. 
Q. All right. On the properties that you and 
your father and brothers are operating, 
which, in your opinion would meet your defi-
nition of a feed lot? 
A. Only the feed lot in the west end of Clinton 
that is fully enclosed with permanent feed 
racks. 
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THE COURT: There isn't any dispute be-
tween the parties on that; is there? 
MR. WARNOCK: Yes, we have put in evi-
dence that the use of the Hooper property 
does constitute a feed lot. 
(Tr. 181) 
The very recent case of Jones vs. Logan City Cor-
poration (Utah Supreme Court No. 10622, May 24, 
1967), furnishes help in this situation. There this Court, 
in ref erring to powers of the Hoard of Condemnation, 
stated: 
"While the statute above mentioned grants to 
cities the power to declare what shall be a nui-
sance, the ordinance before us does not in fact 
define what a nuisance is. Ordinance No. 120 
above ref erred to, which grants to the Board 
of Condemnation the right to determine whether 
ainy building constitutes a menace to public 
health or public safety, does .not provide the 
standards on which the Board can base its find-
ings as to what is or what is not a menace to 
public health or public safety." 
It is hardly any wonder that Judge Cowley ruled 
in the Judgment and Decree that, as to the "Hooper 
Farm" and the "Home Farm"-
"2. That all livestock activities conducted upon 
the remaining real properties belonging to 
defendants, or to any of them, within Clin-
ton City constitutes the seasonal ,winter 
feeding, pasturing and maintaining of live-
stock, . . . and such activities do not con-
stitute 'livestock feed lot' operations within 




THE 'VINTER FEEDING OF CATTLE 
ON THE DEFENDANTS' "HOOPER FARM" 
WAS A REASONABLE AND EXISTING 
NUN-CONFORMING USE. 
Critical to a full understanding of this case is the 
Amended Ordinance of June 3, 1965, referred to in 
the foregoing Statement of Facts. This Ordinance 
related to the winter feeding of livestock and set the 
number at 6 head per acre. Although the trial issue 
was framed on the basis of defendants' having con-
ducted "feed lot" operations, plaintiff filed a Motion 
To Amend Complaint with the Court approximately 
5 days prior to trial. In its Amended Complaint the 
plaintiff for the first time set forth the Ordinance of 
June 3, 1965, relating to winter feeding of livestock. 
The Record before this Court does not include the 
Amended Complaint, but the Transcript is full of refer-
ences to it and the objections made to its late filing 
immediately before trial by counsel for defendants (Tr. 
:.Hl). At any rate, the new Ordinance was injected 
into the lawsuit in an attempt to limit the winter feeding 
activities of defendants on the "Hooper Farm" to 6 
head per acre (or a total of 600 head) . It was implicit 
from the position taken by plaintiffs at the trial that 
it still viewed defendants' activities on the "Hooper 
Farm" as a "feed lot" activity, but apparently plaintiff 
set up the additional ordinance as an attempt to limit 
the activities of defendants on the subject property in 
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the event it failed to secure relief on its "feed lot" 
pleading. 
(A) The Winter Feeding Use Had Existed Ji'or 
Many Years On The "Hooper Farm". 
In tracing the history of the agricultural usage 
of the "Hooper Farm" since 1945, it was developed 
at the trial that this fairly large 100-acre tract ha<l been 
extensively used for livestock feeding purposes of vari-
ous types. Plaintiffs' witness, John T. Child, although 
rather evasive (Tr. 53) as to his own livestock usage 
of the property while he was leasing it from J olm D. 
Hooper, admitted (Tr. 48) that both he, his father, 
and his brothers ran cattle on the property while they 
had it under lease. He clearly remembered (Tr. 49) 
that the maximum number that he had run on the place 
under his own leadership was llO head, but he suffered 
a lapse of memory relative to the number of head which 
the entire family had operated on the property during 
the period between 1940 and 1950, stating (Tr. 53)-
"W ell, the older we get the poorer your memo-
. " ory is. 
Other witnesses familiar with the "Hooper Farm" 
and the livestock activities associated with it over the 
years had somewhat better memories: 
MR. EUGENE 'V ALLACE, a Clinton 
City councilman, who appeared pursuant to a 
subpoena, stated that during the mid-forties he 
hauled potatoes to livestock being fed on the 
properties by the Child family (Tr. 133) , and 
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that " ... There wrw a goodly number of cattle 
... ". (Tr. 135). He stated further that " ... 
I would say they were up in a few hundred head." 
MR. LJ1~0 CHILD, a nearby resident of the 
"Hooper Farm", testified (Tr. 161) that the 
Child family maintained "several hundred head 
a year" of livestock, mostly in the winter season. 
On further questioning he placed the figure, as 
the Child family operated during the middle-
forties, at "Five Hundred to l,000 head". His 
general comment as to the size of the activity of 
the Child family relative to winter feeding of 
cattle was: " ... He was quite a big feeder." 
MR. PARNELL GREEN, a livestock man 
and a livestock trucker, stated that for five or 
six years in the forties he transported livestock 
from the "Hooper Farm" for the Child family 
to Cudahy at regular intervals (Tr. 140), and 
that the farm winter feeding operation was " ... 
similar to the way we do today." He stated that 
at that time there were used portable and sta-
tionary feed troughs so that the cattle could be 
fed around on the entire farm. He observed 
" ... quite a few hundred cattle, and (the num-
bers) would go up and down ... '' (Tr. 150). 
Mr. Green observed that " ... There was a 
good-sized number of cattle there aU the time 
... " and that movements in and out of the 
fields through his trucks would be " . . . from 
200 to 300, and 150 up, and like that. It was at 
that time a good-sized deal." (Tr. 151) . 
It seems that the Child family ran into financing 
difficulties (Tr. 44) and that their operation tapered 
off somewhat. In the later years of Mr. Hooper's lease 
of the property agricultural cropping continued, but 
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the type and volume of animal feeding was somewhat 
reduced and altered. In fact, immediately before the 
Patterson purchase of the farm there were being ruu 
both hogs and cattle on the property. Mr. Anderson, 
the last lessee, testified (Tr. 64) that he had an actual 
feed lot on the premises where he kept an annual gross 
of 300 pigs, and that he sub-leased part of the fields 
far maintaining 100 to 150 head of cattle. 
A non-conforming use of property is not neces-
sarily restricted to the exact number of livestock which 
were placed on a given property at a given time. There 
is a substantial amount of law stating that to simply 
restrict non-conforming uses to exact numbers of ani-
mals, grocery items, automobiles for sale, etc., which 
might have previously related to a given property is 
an illogical approach. In order that a non-conforming 
use be lost as a matter of right, the cases uniformly 
hold that there must be an intent to "abandon" the non-
conforming use. Abandonment requires "intent" under 
the case law, and where non-conforming uses have been 
reduced, or even temporarily terminated, they can be 
re-instated unless the facts show the intent to abandon 
such a use. There is an excellent annotation at 18 
A.L.R. to 726, which points out through numerous cases 
a diminution of, or temporary discontinuance of, a use 
of a non-conforming nature, without an abandonment, 
will not cause the loss of that right to terminate. Ex-
amples cited include economic considerations, seasonal 
or market conditions, difficulty of leasing of property, 
and similar matters. 
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On the issue of whether an expanded volume of 
activity would violate a non-conforming use right, there 
is adequate legal authority indicating that expanded 
volume of use is not necessarily a controlling feature: 
"The general rule is that an increase in volume 
of business alone is not an expansion of a non-
conforming use. (Salerni v. Cheuy 140 Conn. 
566 102 Atlantic 2d 528). Even a great increase 
does not work a prohibited change. (Town of 
Marblehead v. Rosenthall 316 Mass. 124 55 
N.E. 2d 13). In other words, the nonconforming 
use of the same premises may be not only con-
tinued but also increased in volume. (Building 
CommissiJoner of Medford v. McGrath, 312 
Mass. 461, 45 N. E. 2d 265). The prohibition 
of a zoning ordinance is directed to new uses; 
it imposes no restraint upon broadening the 
scope of an existing use. (Bor01tgh of Cheswick 
v. Bechman, 352 Penn. 79, 42 A. 2d 60). Neither 
the extent, quantity or quality of the noncon-
forming use ordinarily is mentioned in zoning 
measures, but only that it must, to exist as of 
right, exist lawfully and in fact when zoning be-
comes effective." 
Borough of Cheswick v Bechman as cited 
McQuillen, "Municipal Corporations," Vol. 
8, sec. 25.208 p 520 
"Increase in volume of business does not effect 
extension of nonconforming use if, in essence, 
the business is the same." 
Kovelman v Plaut 105 N. Y. S. 2d 280 
"An increase in volume or intensity of a non-
conforming use does not constitute an unlawful 
extension or enlargement thereof." 
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People v Ferris, 18 Ill. App. 2d 346, 152 N. 
E. 2d 183 
People v Perkins 282 N.Y. 329, 26 N. E. 2d 
278 
Humphries v Stuart Realty Corp. 364 Pa. 
616, 73 A 2d 407 
Gulf C. and A. F. R. Co. v White 281 S.W. 
2d 441 
* * * 
It should also be brought out that a variation in the 
nature of a non-conforming use, such as partially sub-
stituing a hog operation for a cattle feeding operation 
on the "Hooper" place, likewise does not serve to de-
stroy any established right to the use of his property: 
"The continued non conforming use must be 
similar to the use existing at the time the zoning 
ordinance became effective, and, in determining 
whether the nonconforming use was the same 
before and after the passage of the zoning ordi-
nance, each case must stand on its own facts." 
Edmonds v Los Ange~ County 40 Cal. 2d 
642, 255 p 2d 777 
"The nonconforming use must in substance 
be the same after the passage of a zoning ordi-
nance as it was before. The continuance of an 
existing nonconforming use carries with it all 
the incidents of that use which appertained to 
it when zoning was established in the city." 
Lane v Bigelow 135 N. J. L. 195 50 A. 2d 638 
Abbedessa v Board of Zoning Appeals of New 
Haven 134 Conn. 28 54 A. 2d 675 
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See: McQuillin "Municipal Corporations" 
Vol. 8 sec. 25.201 p 502 
''Generally, an owner of property has a right 
to discontinue a nonconforming use of a building 
and change its use to a higher grade of non-
conf arming use so long as the changed use can 
be carried on with substantially the same facili-
ties as the existing use." 
M cQuillin, "Municipal Corporations" Vol. 8, 
sec. 25.203 p 509 
Higgins v Baltimore, 206 Maryland 89, no 
A. 2d 503 
Palmer v Detroit 306 Mich. 449, II N. W. 2d 
199 
"When we start with the premise that the 
respondent could use his farm for raising cattle 
then there seems to be no reason why he should 
not use the farm for raising horses. Nor do we 
think that because there was a by-product which 
was sold for medicinal purposes changes the 
result in any respect." 
" ... In fine, the premises in question could 
be used for farming. This was a non-conform-
ing use. Because the owner saw fit to use the 
premises for a kind of farming he had not pre-
viously followed, under the facts of this case, 
it is not a violation of the zoning ordinance. 
If in such use he required other buildings that 
circumstance standing alone does not make the 
action of the Board of Adjustment unreason-
able." 
Stuart et al v Mitschele, et al 135 N. J. L. 
406 52 A. 2d 421 
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It should be kept in mind that the owner of the 
"Hooper Farm", prior to its purchase by the Patter-
sons, was an elderly man and that the property had 
been leased for many years. This factor, plus economic 
considerations affecting the cattle business, would natu-
rally support a fluctuation of the type and number 
of animals which the particular property might have 
from year to year. In this respect, the exact number 
of animals so kept on the property by the predecessors 
of the Pattersons is not the controlling feature, nor is 
any particular immediately preceding year of critical 
importance; rather, it is a matter of the nature and 
type of use involved. 
"In construing an ordinance permitting con-
tinuance of any non-conforming use the courts 
are not required to speculate as to the number 
of acts of business transactions necessary to 
constitute an existing use. This holds because 
an existing use means the utilization of premises 
so that they may be known as being employed 
in the neighborhood for a given purpose. 
Kubby v. Hammond, 68 Arizona 17, 198 P. 
2d. 134. 
"The test of a nonconforming use of land and 
dwellings generally is public knowledge of said 
use; said knowledge is requisite to its legal 
protection against zoning restrictions. That is 
to say an existing nonconforming use means a 
certain utilization of the premises that they may 
be known to the neighborhood as being em-
ployed for a given purpose." 
Kubby v. Hammond, 68 Arizona 18, 198 P. 2d 
134 
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"The use need not be in actual operation at 
all when the regulation takes effect." 
DeFelice v Zoning Board of Appeals of the 
Town of East Haven 130 Conn. 156, 32 At-
lantic 2d 635 
"In the case of businesses that are seasonal 
in character the fact that a zoning ordinance 
or restriction becomes effective during a season 
when such a business is not in operation does 
not preclude it from being a legal non-existing 
use." 
Cynic Association of Dearborn TP, Dist. No. 
3 v Horowitz, 318 Michigan 333, 28 N. W. 2d 
97 
Adams v Kalamazoo Ice and Fuel Co. 245 
Mich. 261, 222 N. W. 86 
B. A Winter Feeding Usage of 1,000 Cattle on 
the "Hooper Farm'' was a Reasonable Use. 
--In his Findings of Fact Judge Cowley held both 
that (I) defendants had established a non-conforming 
use for 1,000 head of cattle for winter feeding purposes 
on the "Hooper Farm" (R. 15-16), and also that (2) 
" ... an annual maximum capacity of 1,000 head of 
livestock at any given time is a reasonable number 
under the circumstances to be kept, maintained and 
fed ... during the winter feeding period ... " (R. 15). 
This second Finding is significant not only as to the 
actual established use of the "Hooper Farm", but re-
flects a practical reasoned opinion from the Court's 
view of the premises and a consideration of all of the 
evidence submitted. 
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As a practical matter, the history of the "Hooper 
Farm" clearly established its adaptability for the winter 
feeding of livestock by the use of portable feed troughs. 
Both the size of the property and its sandy soil con-
dition (Tr. 81, 90) made the farm peculiarly adapt-
able to this type of feeding. The 1,000 head of cattle 
which the Pattersons ran on the property during the 
winter seasons of 1964-65 and 1965-66 were by no 
means capacity numbers considering the size of the 
farm and its type of soil. Frank Patterson testified 
that at least double that number would be practical 
in the area (Tr. 90) : 
A. "Well, as few months as we stay there, I 
think we could put 2,000 head on there and 
not do any damage to the ground. I think 
you'd have better crops with 2,000 head." 
Although plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Com-
plaint ( R. 8) seeking to allege that the activity of 
defendants constituted a common nuisance (and which 
was denied (R. 9) since Clinton City did not have a 
nuisance ordinance, and actions sounding in nuisance 
for cities of its class would have to be brought by the 
Utah Attorney General), the entire trial proceedings 
and the evidence submitted is significantly devoid of 
any reference or proof that the activity of the defend-
ants resulted in offensive noises or smells to the few 
scattered neighbors living in the area. Obviously, cer-
tain property owners in the vicinity of the "Hooper 
Farm" apparently objected to the defendants' pur-
chase of the property, but the evidence was completely 
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lacking that there was any nuisance created. In fact, 
had that matter come to issue the Pattersons were pre-
pared to introduce a good number of witnesses who 
had homes surrounding their winter feeding operations, 
and who would have testified that the number of live-
stock and the manner in which they were fed, with 
rotating and moveable facilities, were commendable, 
clean and non-offensive in all respects. The testimony 
would have further revealed, from a good number of 
witnesses, that the cattle feeding operation was effi-
ciently maintained, aesthetically desirable from the 
standpoint of appearances in a country area, and that 
the resulting crop production during the summer months 
on the subject properties produced lush crops and a 
generally beautiful neighborhood. 
The general rule is clearly spelled out in Mc-
Quillen on "Municipal Corporations", Vol. 8, sec. 
25.181, p. 468, and in the case of Wilkins v San Ber-
nardino 29 Cal. 2d 332, 17 5 P 2d 542: 
" ... a zoning ordinance is invalid and un-
reasonable where it attempts to exclude and pro-
hibit existing and established uses or businesses 
that are not nuisances." 
* * * 
"A fair exercise of the police power requires 
that the object and purpose of the ordi-
nance decided in on the public health, safety 
or welfare. The general rule is that aesthetic 
objects in themselves cannot justify the exercise 
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of police or zoning power that restricts or im-
pairs property rights." 
Lockner v New York, 198 U. S. 45, 49 Law. 
Ed. 937, 25 Supreme Court 539 
"Esthetic considerations are a matter of luxury 
and indulgence rather than a matter of neces-
sity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the 
exercise of police power to take private property 
without compensation . (Pfister v Municipr;l 
Council of Clifton) 133 N. J. L. 148, 43 At. 2d 
275. Certainly a zoning ordinance which destrovs 
the greater part of the value of property of ~n 
owner, and which has as its basis the mere en-
hancement of the beauty of the municipality, ' 
is unreasonable as to such property owner. 1 
(Evanns v Gunn 177 .Misc. 85, 29 N. Y. S. 2d : 
368) ... It has been ruled that a zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting garages in a specified district 
is unreasonable as it does not affect public 
health, safety, or general welfare." 
McQuillen, sec. 25.30 Vol. 8, p. 64. "Muni-
cipal Corporations". 
If the Court should harbor any thoughts that the 
1 
"Hooper Farm" was in a populated area, an exami- . 
nation of Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 can undoubtedly serve 1 
to illustrate the locality and type of operation much 
better than pages of argument. Likewise, Exhibits l, 
2 and 3 (which show the 80-acre tract in the west end 
of Clinton Citv where the actual "feed lot" is located)· 
further point .out the general remoteness and agricul-
tural nature of the entire area with which we are con-
cerned. 
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C. The Extent of Defendants' Winter Feeding 
Usage of the "Hooper Farm" Was Established At the 
Time of the June 3, 1965 Ordi'TWlnce. 
Much of the preceding discussion is by this time 
undoubtedly moot, if this argument has been clearly 
presented, for the simple reason that defendants had 
in fact established a numerical usage of 1,000 head of 
livestock for winter feeding purposes on the "Hooper 
Farm" when the winter feeding ordinance of June 3, 
1965, became effective. In short, during the winter 
season of 1964-65 defendants actually ran 965 head 
of animals on the "Hooper Farm". It was on June 3, 
1965 that the ordinance establishing 6 head per acre 
was adopted, thereby actually in fact following an 
established usage of the type contemplated by the ordi-
nance. Further during the following winter season 
of 1965-66, 1,015 head were wintered on the same prop-
erty (Tr. 86). Summons and complaint issued on or 
about February 9, 1966. 
Although plaintiff would hope to relate the June 
3, 1965 ordinance back to the February, 1964 general 
ordinance, the law and the chronology of facts and cir-
cumstances in this case clearly indicate that it cannot 
do so. 
Zoning ordinances and their amendments take 
effect from a legally prescribed date, and do not operate 
retroactively. Therefore, a minimum usage of the "Hoo-
per" place of 1,000 animals per year for winter feeding 
could not be denied them under the facts of this case. 
31 
"A zoning ordinance takes effect from the pre-
scribed date by law." 
London v. Robimon 94 Cal. App. 77 4, 271 p 
921. 
"As a rule the ordinance operates prospective-
ly and as to new uses only and not retroactively 
or as to existing non-conforming uses." 
Allen v Corpus Christi (Tex.) 247 S. W. 2d, 
130 
"As in the case of the original zoning ordi-
nance, an amending or appealing ordinance takes 
effect from the legally prescribed date. Charter 
provisions may govern the effective date of a 
zoning ordinance amendment." 
Riverdale Community Planning Association, 
Inc. vs Crinnion, 133 N. Y. Supp. 2d 706 
"A zoning ordinance may not operate retro-
actively to deprive the property owner of his 
previously vested right; that is to say, a zoning 
ordinance cannot deprive the owner of the use 
to which the property was put before the enact-
ment of the ordinance." 
Tram-Oceanic Corporation v Santa Barbara 
85 Cal. App 2d 776 194 P2d 148 
State v. Bellview 45 Washington 2d 492, 275 
P2d 899 
"Subsequent zoning ordinances cannot div~st 
rights acquired by property owners under pr10r 
zoning ordinances.'' 
State v Superior Court of King County 144 
Washington 244, 284 P. 93 
"Zoning regulations cannot be made retro-
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active and neither can prior nonconforming uses 
be removed or existing conditions be affected 
thereby." 
Dunes v Los Angeles 211 California 304, 295 
P. 14 
Although plaintiffs might contend that the June 
3, 1965 ordinance was a modification or relenting of a 
more harsh position as to Uses by Right established 
by the February 1964 Ordinance, such a position cannot 
stand up under the facts of the case, the general con-
fusion which reigned as to the subject, and an analysis 
of the ordinance itself. The following points are sug-
gested for consideration concerning a comparison of 
the general ordinance of 1964 and th specific ordinance 




The definition of Agricultural in the 1964 
general ordinance, wherein was included the 
phrase--'"and specifically excluding "live-
stock feed lots" --can only be reasonably 
interpreted as permitting, by implication, 
less objectionable livestock feeding systems. 
The provisions of the June 3, 1965 Ordi-
nance (which contained provisions applic-
able only to these defendants) point out that 
plaintiff felt the winter feeding situation 
was not covered by the 1964 general ordi-
nance. 
If the 1964 general ordinance prohibited 
winter field feeding, why did plaintiff feel it 
necessary to adopt the June 3, 1965 Ordi-
nance - and with provisions which con-
formed in exact detail with the feeding pro-
cedure followed by respondents? 
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III. 
THE EXTENT OF \VINTER FEEDING 
OPERATIONS ON THE VARIOUS FIELDS 
OF THE "HOME FARM" WAS NEVER AT 
ISSUE IN THE LITIGATION. 
As previously pointed out, the matter of winter 
feeding on the various fields involving the "Home 
Farm" was never raised-if at all-until respondents i 
were served with the Motion To Amend Complaint 
setting up the June 3, 1965 ordinance, just about four 
or five days prior to trial. The winter feeding program 
on the established older properties of respondents had 
been conducted for many years prior to the passage 
of any of the involved ordinances, and by the admission 
of all concerned constituted a non-conforming use. 
As the trial commenced it soon became obvious 
that the only property of real concern in the litigation 
was the "Hooper Farm", and that the extent of the 
usage on the "Home Farm" was of only incidental 
concern. Although appellant questioned the Pattersons 
relative to some of the feeding practices and numbers 
of animals as to the "Home Farm", counsel for re· 
spondents - proceeding under the representation of 
appellants that the "Hooper Farm" was the only prop· 
erty involved-did not attempt to furnish detailed num· j 




In announcing its decision in the matter the Court, I 
' 
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in referring to the "Home Farm" stated (Supp. Rec-
ord): 
"The court further finds that the defendants 
have a non-conforming use for the winter feed-
ing of 1000 head of cattle on the "Hooper Prop-
erty" and are not restricted to feeding 250 head 
of cattle within a fenced area on said "Hooper 
Property". 
"Issues pertainining to defendants' other lands 
apparently are not in dispute but should be 
covered by the Findings, Conclusions and De-
cree . . . " ( I tali cs added) . 
Sid Charles G. Cowley 
District Judge 
Proceeding with the instruction of the Court, coun-
sel for respondents, in preparing the F'indings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Decree, in-
serted a paragraph in the Findings (R. 12} relating 
to a maximum usage of 2,500 head of livestock at any 
time for winter feeding purposes on the "Home Farm", 
and set forth two additional pages (R. 13-14} attempt-
ing to reasonably detail the number of animals per 
field on such property. This maximum number of 
2,500 head of livestock was carried forward into the 
Judgment and Decree (R. 20}. 
The involved portions of the Findings of Fact were 
submitted to counsel for appellants by respondent sev-
eral months before the Motion For New Trial was 
argued since the parties were desirous, if possible, of 
working out some of the differences. However, the 
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matter eventually came before the Court for the sign-
ing of the Findings of Fact, and Judgment and De-
cree, and it was argued. At the time of argument coun-
sel for respondents agreed to eliminate pages 4 and 5 
(R. 13-14) of the Findings-thereby fixing a simple 
maximum number of 2,500 head of livestock on the 
entire "Home Farm", but counsel for appellants de-
cided perhaps that those pages should not be deleted. 
At any rate, the upshot of the matter as to the "Home 
Farm" was that Judge Cowley entered his :Minute 
Entry (R. 29) stating: 
"Counsel will confer on working out some of 
the problems and agree that the :Motion for a 
New Trial is submitted on the issue of the Hoo-
per Property. 
"Court takes matter under advisement." 
C.G.C." 
On March 31, 1967, Judge Cowley made his Final 
Minute Entry Ruling (R. 30) on the :Motion For New 
Trial, as follows: 
"This matter having been taken under advise-
ment the Court now finds the Plaintiffs' Ob-
jections To Proposed Findings of Fact and Mo 
tion For New Trial is hereby denied, except as 
to such changes in the proposed Findings that 
apply to the so-called Home Properties, which 
the parties have agreed to." 
C.G.C." 
'Vhy the appellants seek to raise any question 
concerning the amount of liYestock numbers on the 
"Home Farm" at this point is extremely difficult to 
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understand. As pointed out previously from the evi-
dence, a given number of animals can only be kept on 
a single field for a limited period of time due to the 
amount of fertilizer which can be utilized by the soil, 
the type of soil, and the number of animals involved. 
In short, a larger herd would be on a small field for 
a very limited time, whereas a small number of animals 
might be on the field for a larger length of time. In 
the absence of nuisance considerations, the matter 
simply resolves itself from the standpoint of practical 
considerations. This total lack of understanding of 
the problem helps to explain why appellant has floun-
dered around so much in its attempts to formulate 
realistic ordinances. 
Another unusual and interesting facet to the live-
stock numbers which can be fed during the winter 
months on the "Home Farm" is that the actual winter 
feeding usage of the "Home Farm" was more than 
3,000 head. Frank Patterson testified (R. 99) : 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) Now going back to 1962 
and '63, that winter, could you give us a little 
idea as to the numbers you had? 
A. No, that was before we bought that Hooper 
place. We had around about, oh, I'd say we 
fed around about 3000 head. 
Q. About 3000 head? 
A. That's right. I thing it's a fraction over 3000 
head of cattle. 
Q. Were most of the 3000 head similarly win-
tered on the Home place? 
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A. That's right. 
Q. I take it from your testimony, then, that 
when you secured the Hooper place, the net 
effect has been to somewhat reduce the winter 
number that you carried on the Home place! • 
A. That's right." 
(R. 99) : 
The very peculiar aspect of this case is that re· 
spondents have actually conceded a usage right of 500 
animals on their "Home Farm", which they could have 
clearly established had this matter been fully litigated. 
On the other hand, they have been awarded a usage 
right of 400 head more than the June 3, 1965 Ordinance 
would have given them for the "Hooper Farm" as a 
result of the litigation. It is obvious that the appellants 
in this action have gained an overall advantage limit-
ing the total net winter feeding usage of the Patter-
sons in the entire area by 100 head of animals. 
IV. 
THE INVOLVED ORDINANCES ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTS SPECIFICAL-
LY DIRECTED AT THESE DEFENDANTS. 
The foregoing discussion has pointed out that the 
reference to "livestock feed lots" in the 1964 general 
ordinance, and the specific provisions of the June 3, 
1965 ordinance relating to winter feeding of livestock, 
all appear to be peculiarly aimed at these respondents. 
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Other evidence further proves that the ordinances 
adopted by plaintiff require this conclusion. 
Prior to the adoption of the June 3, 1965 winter 
feeding ordinance there were recommendations made 
to the plaintiffs' city council by the Clinton City Plan-
ning Commission that winter feeding activities of live-
stock within the community be fixed at substantial 
numbers of animals in excess of the number finally 
placed in the ordinance. Lewis Patterson testified that 
the Planning Commission made recommendations to the 
City Council relative to winter feeding operations of 
15, 10 and finally 8 head per acre (Tr. 177), and that 
the Planning Commission ref used to agree with the 
final figure adopted by the City Council of 6 head 
per acre for winter feeding purposes. Similarly, and 
as to the same June 3, 1965 Ordinance, wherein there 
was a limitation of 250 head which could be kept in 
a given field for winter feeding purposes, the City 
Council adopted such a provision contrary to any recom-
mendation of the Planning Commission (Tr. 177): 
Q. "Now as to the provision relative to a maxi-
mum that they've got in this ordinance of 
250 head of livestock confined within the 
same fenced area, was that a recommenda-
tion of the Planning Commission? 
A. No, it was not." 
Both the City Recorder (Tr. 39) and Lewis Pat-
terson (Tr. 180) stated that the attempt to limit the 
number of livestock to a given fenced area would affect 
no property owners in the Clinton City area other than 
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the Pattersons. When questioned as to the effect of 
such a limitation, the following answers were given: 
FRANK PATTERSON (Tr. 95-96) : 
Q. (Mr. Fuller) \V ould it be practical, Mr. Pat-
terson, to group these livestock into units 
of 250 head and keep them in single fenced 
fields? 
A. No. You couldn't do it. \Ve haven't got the 
water facilities, to start with, and you couldn't 
divide them up that it. It wouldn't work for 
you. 
Q. From the standpoint of taking the feed and 
feeding the animals, would a group of 250 
head be as practical as your larger group! 
A. No. 
Q. And why not? 
A. \Vell, you take the larger group-we have 
the water there for them. And you take where 
you're feeding a large group, you take a big 
load of silage out-probably two. I think 
we fed two to each side. 
And on a small group, you'd have to spend 
just as much gas to feed probably half that 
many or a third that many as you would the 
whole works. 
While there, your expenses are all eliminated 
from the little group, see. 
Q. What about your time expenditure? 
A. Well, time too. It takes just as much time 
to feed 200 head as it would-that is,to haul 
that much feed over to a small group or a 
little group, as it would a big group ... " 
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LEWIS PATTERSON (Tr. 178): 
A .. "If we were to restrict it to 6 head per acre, 
it would be almost impossible to continue 
because an individual would have to place 
the 6 head in different areas all around. You 
couldn't find that many watering areas which 
would be suitable. 
If we went into a field, for instance-For 
instance, let's take the Hooper place. If it 
was restricted there to 250 head in a fenced 
area, and the 6 head, a person would go there 
and they could only take a half a load of 
feed in some instances. They would have 
to unload a half a load and guess at it, go 
to another field and unload the other half." 
It is the position of respondents that when a legis-
lative body such as the Clinton City Council attempts 
to draft ordinances specifically directed at a given prop-
erty owner within its jurisdiction, and when such ordi-
nances are so framed that they would have the effect of 
destroying the type of usage permitted by limitations 
which would not fit modern economic and operating 
conditions, such ordinances are invalid and void. 
"Zoning is void when it is unreasonable, op-
pressive, arbitrary, or discriminatory." 
Beverly Oil Co. v. L,o.s Angeles 40 Cal. 2d 
552, 254 p 2d 865 
Cassel Realty Co. v Omaha 144 Neb. 753, 14 
N. W. 2d 600 
"Where the amendment of a zoning ordinance 
is clearly an arbitrary and unreasonable action 
on the part of the city council and not author-
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ized or contemplated by the zoning statute, it is 
of no force and effect." 
Michigan Lake Building Corporation v. Ham-
ilton 340 Ill. 284, 172 N.E. 710 
"Unreasonable discrimination in the classifi. 
cation of uses and restrictions of zoning is un- 1 
constitutional and void. It violates both equal · 
protection and due process of law." 
Wilkins v San Bernardino 29 Cal. 2d 332, 
175 P. 2d 542 
"Restrictions on uses under comprehensive 
zoning must be reasonable and not arbitrary. 
Nor can they be discriminatory although they 
can make distinctions based on reasonable 
grounds related to purposes within the police 
power. They must be imposed in the public in-
terest and not for the benefit or to the detriment 
of certain property owners." 
Eubank v Richmond 226 U. S. 137, 57 Law 
Ed. 156, 33 Supreme Court 76 
"If a zoning ordinance goes beyond its true 
purpose in restricting the use of private property, 
it is unreasonable, arbitrary and unconstitu-
tional." 
N e.ef v Springfield 380 Ill. 27 5, 43 N. E. 2d 
947 
"A zoning restriction which not only fails to 
serve any public interest but which is imposed 
to favor or benefit certain private interests, which 
is for the purpose of creating a monopoly of use 
of property and excluding other enterprises, ?r 
which on the other hand, is directed at certam 
persons or private interests is unconstitutional 
and invalid. It cannot be discriminatory." 
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Ridgefield Terrace Realty Co. v Borough of 
Ridgefield, 138 N. J. L. 311, 55 A. 2d 812, 
Davidson County v Rogers, 184 Tenn. 327, 
198 s. w. 2d 812 
Funk v Orleans Corp. 159 Fla. 646, 32 S. 2d 
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M cQuillen, "Municipal Corporations", Vol. 8 
sec. 25.42 p. 90-91 
"Zoning ordinances or amendments are un-
justified where they are enacted merely because 
certain individuals desire them and have no other 
apparent basis." 
Kennedy v Evanston 348 Ill. 426, 181 N. E. 
312 
• • • 
"Zoning regulations like other ordinance pro-
visions may operate unreasonably in some in-
stances and reasonably in others. Thus, a zoning 
ordinance, reasonable in general, may be un-
reasonable in its application to particular prop-
erty. Indeed, it is said repeatedly by the courts 
that the constitutionality and validity of zoning 
must be determined according to the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case, and this is 
true relative to the reasonableness of such ordi-
nances. Thus, if the property owner seeking 
relief shows that the ordinance is unreasonable, 
oppressive and arbitrary as to his property rights 
in issue, he need not show that other property 
covered by its terms is likewise affected. 
McQuillen, "Municipal Corporations" Vol. 8 
sec. 25.63, p. 142 
"If the gain to the public is small when com-
pared with the hardship imposed on the indi-
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vidual property owner by a zoning ordinance, 
no valid basis for exercise of the police power 
exists. Zoning laws resulting in relatively little 
gain or benefit to the public, while inflicting 
serious injury or loss on property owner are con-
fiscatory and void. 
Hauser v Arnes 267 P 2d 691, 44 Wash. 2d 
-(1954). 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully submit that the decision 
of the lower court was correct in that they were not 
operating livestock feed lots on their "Hooper Farm'' 
or their "Home Farm", that the winter feeding on 
both properties in the amounts decided by the Court 
was both reasonable in amount and that the usage was 
a valid non-conforming use, and that the specific pro-
visions of the ordinances relating to winter feeding 
of not to exceed 6 head per acre-with a maximum 
number of 250 head of livestock within a fenced area 
--constitute void legislation as to respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Glen E. Fuller 
Attorney for Respondents 
15 East 4th South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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